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Rhetoric of a troubled industry:  
The case of the Dundee jute industry during the inter-war period 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This study examines the rhetorical strategies deployed by supporters of the Dundee jute industry 
during the legislative debate surrounding British trade policy of the inter-war period.  It conducts a 
content analysis of the February 2, 1938 House of Commons debate on a motion entitled 
µ,PSRUWDWLRQV IURP2YHUVHDV¶.  This debate highlights the position and the rhetorical strategies of 
the jute industry through its parliamentary surrogates.  Analysis suggests that rhetorical strategies 
challenged policy, while avoiding a direct or explicit challenge to the dominant institutional logic of 
free trade.  This study also furthers our understanding of government-industry relations in the jute 
industry during the inter-war period.  
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1. Introduction 
 
An important aspect of changing public attitudes and shifting government policy is the successful 
deployment of rhetorical strategies.  Attention has been given to this phenomenon in the academic 
literature concerned with the use of rhetoric to legitimize shifts in institutional logics resulting in 
SURIRXQGLQVWLWXWLRQDOFKDQJH6XGGDE\DQG*UHHQZRRGDUJXHWKDW³>U@KHWRULFDQG
SDUWLFXODUO\WKHµQHZUKHWRULF¶)UHHGPDQDQG0HGZD\UHVWULFWVLWVIRFXVWRH[SOLFLWO\
political or interest-laden discourse and seeks to identify genres or recurrent patterns of interests, 
JRDOVDQGVKDUHGDVVXPSWLRQVWKDWEHFRPHHPEHGGHGLQSHUVXDVLYHWH[WV´S7KHLQWHUHVW-
laden discourse of this study is the public discourse employed by the Dundee Jute Industry (DJI) to 
lobby for increased protectionism against foreign competition. 
 
In examining the connection between rhetoric and legitimacy, it will become clear that the extant 
literature coalesces around three important themes: the theoretical and practical implications of 
rhetoric, the need for rhetorical appeals to shift institutional logics, thus legitimating a new 
organisational, or institutional, order, and the link between rhetoric (and legitimacy) to rationality 
and narrative. 
 
The traditional, primary division in the organization studies scholarship has been between those 
who emphasize institutional sources of legitimacy (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1991; Meyer & Scott, 1983a) and those who focus on strategic sources of legitimacy (e.g., 
Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Pfeffer, 1981).   However, more recently, there 
has been a growing body of literature which explores language as a third possible source of 
legitimacy. (e.g.,  Heracleous and Hendry (2000); Philips and Hardy (2002); Philips, et al. (2004) 
and Golant and Sillince, (2007)).   
 
Emerging from the literature of this language-focused approach, a number of scholars have 
identified rhetoric as a central legitimating device employed in the re-shaping of institutional logics 
through these contests of legitimacy.  This small, but growing, body of literature examines the ways 
in which rhetoric is used to build legitimacy (Suddaby and Greenwood 2005; Vaara, et al. 2006; 
Van Leeuwen 2007; Vaara and Tienari 2008; Erkama and Vaara 2010).   
 
Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) examine the role that rhetoric played in the legitimation of 
significant shifts in the institutional order of multi-disciplinary professional firms (MDP).  This 
µOHJLWLPDF\FRQWHVW¶ZDVSUHFLSLWated by the purchase of a law firm by one of the Big Five 
accounting firms.  This acquisition sparked debate as to whether it was appropriate to allow the co-
mingling of legal and auditing services within a single organisation.  The authors employ neo-
institutional theory to answer how affected actors seek to confer or deny legitimacy to new 
institutional forms.  They note that new institutional forms do not emerge frequently.  Further, they 
assert that it is only through the displacement of the existing institutional logics, with an amended 
and supporting set of logics, that new institutional forms acquire legitimacy and come into 
existence.  They argue that this displacement of logics is achieved primarily through the use of 
persuasive language or rhetoric (p. 35).  To examine the shift in institutional logics of MDPs, they 
took as their primary data the transcripts of testimony given to the American Bar Association 
(ABA) Commission to Study Multidisciplinary Practice and the Securities and Exchange 
CommissLRQ6(&3XEOLF+HDULQJVRQ$XGLWRU,QGHSHQGHQFH³&ROOHFWLYHO\WKHWUDQVFULSWVDQG
supporting documents provide[d] a comprehensive account of the language used to contest the 
legitimacy of the new organizational form.  ...  The data thus capture the arguments used by key 
DFWRUVHQJDJHGLQDOHJLWLPDF\FRQWHVWRYHULQVWLWXWLRQDOORJLFV´6XGGDE\DQG*UHHQZRRG
42).  From this analysis, five categories of classification emerged: historical, value-based, 
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teleological, ontological and cosmological.   This work contributes to the understanding of the 
development of cognitive legitimacy by illustrating how rhetoric is used to shape institutional logics 
thus creating momentum for, and eliminating resistance to, institutional change. 
 
Like Suddaby and Greenwood (2005), Erkama and Vaara (2010) are concerned with rhetorical 
strategies of legitimation.  Specifically, they focus on the rhetorical legitimation of the closure of 
the Volvo-owned, Carrus manufacturing plant in Finland.   The authors compiled a dataset in line 
ZLWKDµFODVVLFDOTXDOLWDWLYHFDVHVWXG\¶LQZKLFKWKH\H[DPLQHGWUDQVFULSWVRILQWHUYLHZVPHGLD
reports, minutes of meetings, confidential company documents as well as official publications, 
WKURXJKWKHXVHRIDQµDEGXFWLYH¶DSSURDFKWKDWDOORZed them to refine their theoretical ideas as 
WKHLUDQDO\VLVSURJUHVVHG7KHDLPRIWKHLUUHVHDUFKZDVWRSURYLGHD³PRUHQXDQFHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
of how contemporary industrial closures are legitimated and resisted ... [and] ... increase the 
theoretical undHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHUROHRIUKHWRULFLQOHJLWLPDWLRQPRUHJHQHUDOO\´S7KH
authors draw on the same classic rhetorical classification system as Suddaby and Greenwood 
(2005), that of logos, pathos and ethos, but add the categories of autopoiesis and cosmos.  They 
DVVHUWWKDWWKLVDOORZVDEHWWHUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI³WKHPXOWLSOHGLVFXUVLYHIDFHWVLQWKHOHJLWLPDWLRQRI
GUDVWLFRUJDQL]DWLRQDOUHVWUXFWXULQJGHFLVLRQVVXFKDVLQGXVWULDOVKXWGRZQV´S 
 
Vaara, et al (2006) also examine the phenomenon of organizational transformation.  Whereas, 
Suddaby and Greenwood examined the legitimation process that allowed the amalgamation of legal 
and audit services in MDP firms, Vaara, et al examined the discursive legitimation of industrial 
restructuring.  The authors explored the merger between the Finnish pulp and paper firm Enso with 
the Swedish firm Stora.  Using Critical Discourse Analysis as their method, which was based both 
on the work of Fairclough (1997; 2003) and the discourse historical method of Wodak, et al. (1999) 
and Wodak and Meyer (2002), the authors examine the media accounts of the merger process 
exclusively (p. 6-7).  Their research takes the form of a three-stage analysis.  In the first stage, they 
conduct a thematic analysis in order to highlight important issues within the case and in the arena of 
global industrial restructuring more broadly.  The second stage of analysis involved an inter-
discursive analysis, with attention to discourses employed when addressing the previously 
identified themes.  They were able to identify neoliberal, nationalistic, humanistic and 
entertainment discourses.  Finally, they employed a textual analysis in order to discover how 
particular discourses were employed for either legitimation or de-legitimation purposes.   The result 
was the identification of five main types of legitimation strategies: normalization, authorization, 
rationalization, moralization and narrativization.  The most important contributions, relevant to 
legitimating of organizational change, made by the authors are two-fold.  Importantly, they 
contribute to the understanding of discursive elements of legitimacy through the creation of a model 
of legitimation strategies.  While perhaps not revolutionary, in that rationalisation and moralisation 
match the classic rhetorical categories of logos and ethos closely and their categories of 
normalisation and authorisation could comfortably be associated with Weberian concepts of 
traditional and legal domination, this framework is a useful synthesis of rhetorical strategies of 
legitimation in the context of changes to industrial institutional frameworks.  
   
As is clear from this recent body of literature on the rhetorical sources of legitimacy, scholars have 
formulated their own frameworks to account for the ways in which rhetorical strategies are 
deployed in legitimation processes.  While a general consensus on a universal system of 
categorisation has not been reached, significant overlap in the categories, if not the nomenclature, is 
evident.  The contribution of this body of literature is central to informing both the theory and the 
method of this research project. 
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In this study, we have examined the deliberate use of persuasive language deployed in the UK 
House of Commons during the 1938 parliamentary debate concerning the possibility of trade 
regulation and the future of the Dundee Jute Industry (DJI).  This debate was a reflection of the 
LQGXVWU\¶VDWWHPSWWRUHVLVWWKHGRPLQDQWLQVWLWXWLRQDOORJLFVRIIUHHWUDGHDQGVKLIW8.WUDGHSROLF\
on to a more protectionist footing.  As explored above, the extant literature is focused on analyzing 
the use of language for the purpose of altering perceptions of legitimacy and shifting dominant 
logics.   We anchor this study of the use of rhetoric in an institutional legitimation contest in the 
empirical context of the DJI during the inter-war period.  In doing so, we accept the assertion of 
(UNDPDDQG9DDUDWKDWWKHUHLVDQHHGIRUIXWXUHUHVHDUFKRI³FDVHVLQGLIIHUHQWVRFLR-
political and cultural contexts to be able to distinguish and compare rhetorical dynamics in more 
QXDQFHGZD\V´S7KHUHIRUHWKLVSDSHUDVNVWKHIROORZLQJTXHVWLRQWhat rhetorical 
strategies were deployed by, and on behalf of, the Dundee Jute industry during the public policy 
debate surrounding British trade policy during the inter-war period? 
 
2. The Dundee Jute Industry 
 
The textile sector in Dundee began with the prosperous flax spinning and weaving industry in the 
late 18th century.  However, the Crimean war in 1854 brought an abrupt halt in the import of flax, 
leading to a sudden rise in the price of goods.  Under these circumstances, manufacturers were 
IRUFHGWRLQWURGXFHMXWH*DXOGLH7KHLQLWLDOUHVLVWDQFHIURPFXVWRPHUVDERXWMXWH¶VLQIHULRU
quality was soon overcome when its cost advantage over flax became apparent (Woodhouse and 
%UDQGDQGMXWHVRRQUHSODFHGIOD[DVWKHLQGXVWU\¶VVWDSOHILEUH 
 
By the 1860s, the DJI experienced rapid growth.  However, by the 1880s, continental tariffs and 
competition from &DOFXWWDLQ,QGLDZHUHFXWWLQJLQWR'XQGHH¶VWUDGLWLRQDOPDUNHWV/HQPDQ/\WKH
and Gauldie 1969: 33).  As the DJI was dependent heavily on export markets, this competition had 
serious implications.  The industry, through the Dundee Chamber of Commerce (DCC), made 
numerous representations to the Board of Trade (BoT) in an attempt to negotiate more favourable 
rates.  Even so, this had little effect and the tariffs continued into the 1880s.  By 1883, import tariffs 
had been imposed in all major markets across Europe on jute goods.  The damaging impact on the 
industry can be adjudged by the great amount of time devoted to resolving this issue in the DCC.  
By the end of the nineteenth century there was a sense of acceptance that prohibitive import tariffs 
were part of business life.  
 
To compound its plight, the industry was facing another, and more serious, competitive threat from 
India.  By the 1890s the Indian industry had expanded rapidly.  In 1882, it had 21 mills, with a total 
of 5655 looms and 91,000 spindles, which by 1892 increased to 26 with 8101 looms and 162,000 
spindles.  However, when global demand fell in the 1920s, the Indian industry was unable to reduce 
its production (Stewart 1998: 93).  Attempts were made by the Indian Jute Manufacturers 
Association to cut output and restrictions were enforced in the form of a curtailment of working 
hours up to 40 hours a week (Gupta 2005: 539).  However, not all firms joined the agreement and 
WKHVHµRXWVLGH¶ILUPVFRQWLQXHGWRRSHUDWHDWKRXUVSHUZHHN0DQ\RIWKHµRXWVLGH¶ILUPVZHUH
newly-established with Indian ownership.  With relatively new machinery, it was in their interest to 
increase output to recover their investments (Gupta 2005: 539).  
 
For Dundee, such growing international competition led to increased pressure in all areas, including 
yarn, cloth, sacks and bags.  Imports into the domestic market rose sharply e.g., piece goods (any 
fabric that has been made-up for sale) rose from 564.33 in 1924 to 714.63 (000 square yards) in 
1935.  Similarly, the import of sacks and bags rose from 428 in 1924 to 639 (000 dozens) in 1936.  
In addition to competition in their domestic market, the Dundee firms faced restrictions in major 
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export markets in continental Europe.  This was driven by high import taxes imposed on the 
continent to protect domestic industries.  For example, in 1929-30 the import tax in France was 
64%, Germany 50%, Belgium 38% and Italy 30% respectively1.  As a consequence, the DJI 
underwent a significant contraction.  While production increased in India by 48.5% and Continental 
Europe by 21%, it decreased in Dundee by 35% 2. The industry responded by making nominal 
reductions in wages in 1930 and 1931 to regain some competitiveness (Morelli and Tomlinson 
2008). Yet, such measures did not go IDUHQRXJKWRUHJDLQWKHLQGXVWU\¶VFRPSHWLWLYHQHVVLQthe 
global market.  
 
It was within this context that the DJI, particularly the manufacturers (spinners and weavers), 
through the Association of Jute Spinners and Manufacturers (AJSM), attempted to influence 
government policy through the deployment of rhetorical strategies intended to shift the dominant 
free-trading logics to a more favourable protectionist policy logic.  With a greater understanding of 
the rhetorical strategies employed by industry proponents during this key Parliamentary debate, we 
ZLOOH[SORUHWKHUHOHYDQFHRI9DDUDHWDO¶VPRGHOIRUOLQJXLVWLF-based legitimation strategies 
to our findings. 
 
3. Method 
 
This study employs a computer assisted content analysis of the February 2, 1938 House of 
Commons debate on a motion entitled µ,PSRUWDWLRQVIURP2YHUVHDV¶.  This debate highlights the 
position and the rhetorical strategies of the DJI through its parliamentary surrogates.  This motion, 
and subsequent debate, sought to preserve existing tariffs and introduce additional trade protections 
in an attempt to mitigate the impact of less expensive Indian jute imports on Dundee jute producers 
within the domestic UK marketplace.  While the pro-Jute coalition in the House included specific 
language around the protection of the DJI, the broader rhetorical debate sought to include the plight 
of other industries which faced strong competition from competing imports.  This was consistent 
with the general industry strategy of seeking a broad coalition of UK producers, across industries, 
who faced less expensive competition from foreign goods. 
 
The resultant debate lasted approximately three hours and forty-five minutes and is preserved in the 
form of a 26,000 word transcription contained in the British parliamentary record, Hansard.  This 
written transcript, available in Hansard, provided the textual dataset for this research project. 
 
4. Findings 
 
The debate was initiated by a motion recommending that the Government take a protectionist 
approach in their negotiations with Dominion and foreign governments.  On February 2nd, 1938, in 
the House of Commons, Sir Arnold Wilson (Member for Hitchin) and Miss Horsbrugh (Member for 
WKH&LW\RI'XQGHHSURSRVHGDQGVHFRQGHGUHVSHFWLYHO\D3ULYDWH0HPEHU¶VPRWLRQHQWLWled 
µ,PSRUWDWLRQVIURP2YHUVHDV¶.   
 
6LU$UQROG:LOVRQ¶Vµ,PSRUWDWLRQVIURP2YHUVHDV¶ motion, that generates this debate, is as follows:  
 
 That this House is of opinion that in negotiations for trade agreements with the Dominions 
 and with foreign countries His Majesty's Government, while doing everything possible to 
                                                          
1 Dundee University Archives MS/84/1-64: Dundee Jute Spinners and Manufacturers Association Annual Reports, 1930 
2 Dundee University Archives MS/84/1-64: Dundee Jute Spinners and Manufacturers Association, Annual Report, 1934 
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 assist the export trade and promote the prosperity of the country as a whole, should have 
 special regard to the effect upon particular industries in this country of imports from 
 countries with low standards of wages, especially where the industries in question are 
 concentrated in a limited area in the United Kingdom; and urges that the need for 
 safeguarding the United Kingdom jute industry against the competition of Indian jute goods 
 should be placed in the forefront of the resumed negotiations with the Government of 
 India.  
      (Hansard: 1938, Vol. 331) 
 
7KHSURSRQHQWVRIWKLVOHJLVODWLRQVRXJKWWKHµVDIHJXDUG¶RIWDULIIEDUULHUVRQJRRGVIURPWKH
Dominions and an assurance from the Government that existing tariffs on goods from foreign 
nations would remain in place.  While the debate was primarily intended to focus on, and support 
the interests of, the DJI, the debate was cast in broad terms, as summarised by Mr Euan Wallace: 
 
 ³There are, as has been said, two aspects of the Motion on the Paper: first of all, the 
 large general question of imports from low-wage standard countries in relation to trade 
 agreements; and, secondly, the particular subject of the competition of Indian jute goods 
 with the products of Dundee ³(Hansard: 1938). 
 
Included in this debate is the introduction of an amendment which proposed a more extreme 
solution, which was not supported by either Miss Horsbrugh or Sir Arnold.  Rather than focusing on 
the protection of domestic industries, Mr MacLean Wilson, a staunch pro-protectionist Member of 
Parliament and a former trade unionist, sought a complete ban on all imports from nations that had 
wage levels and working conditions below those of Great Britain.  He articulated his position, as 
follows: 
 
 ³>@WDNLQJQRWHRIWKHHIIHFWVRIWKHH[SORLWDWLRQLQWKHMXWHLQGXVWU\LQ%HQJDOE\%ULWLVK
 and other capital, calls upon the Government to promote an international conference for the 
 purpose of fixing minimum standards of labour conditions and imposing an international 
 prohibition of imports of goods produced under conditions below those standards so long as 
 there is an alternative source of supply of such goods produced under fair and reasonable 
 FRQGLWLRQV´+DQsard: 1938). 
 
While this severe policy could have assisted the DJI with its concerns of the inexpensive Indian 
imports of jute, Sir Arnold and Miss Horsbrugh considered the motion too extreme and a risk to 
their, more modest, proposal contained in the original motion.  Generally, there was little popular 
support for such drastic action and Mr Wilson appeared to have a primarily ideological motivation, 
given his trade unionist background, beyond the support of any one industry in general or the DJI in 
particular. 
 
In fact Mr Wilson noted, he had little sympathy for the DJI, especially the owners of the firms: 
 
 ³>@DJUHDWGHDORIFDSLWDOVXQNLQWKH%HQJDOMXWHLQGXVWU\ZDV%ULWLVKFDSLWDO- Dundee 
 capital.  It was British capital that set up the mills in Bombay and in India  generally.  That 
 is where the trouble began and how it began.  Not only was there British capital but there 
 was British machinery, and there were managers from Dundee, technicians from Dundee, 
 workers from Dundee, teaching Indians how to operate these jute machines.  That was the 
 EHJLQQLQJRIWKHWURXEOH´+DQVDUG 
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7KHSURSRQHQWVRIWKHRULJLQDOPRWLRQFRQVLGHUHG0U:LOVRQ¶VDPHQGPHQWXQKHOSIXODQGDWDFWLFRI
delay.  Miss Horsbrugh stated her opposition to the amendment: 
 
 ³,WKLQN,PDGHLWFOHDUWKDW,RSSRVH>WKHDPHQGPHQW@EHFDXVH,FRQVLGHUWKDWLWLVDGHOD\LQJ
 Amendment, and that while you are trying to get up the standard of the people in India and 
 elsewhere and trying to get an agreement through the International Labour Office, the 
 standard of the people of this country and of Dundee in particular will go down.  My motion 
 LVTXLFNHUDQGPRUHOLNHO\WRVXFFHHG´+DQVDUG 
 
These themes of urgency and the protection of the standard of living of British workers figure 
prominently in the rhetorical strategies of industry proponents.  A full accounting of the rhetorical 
strategies employed by proponents of the industry in an attempt to shift the dominant logics from 
free trade to protectionism are explored in the following section. 
 
 4.1 Rhetorical Strategies 
 
In speaking in favor of the Motion, proponents focused their argumentation on mainly two dozen 
topics.  Through further analysis, it was clear that these topics could be grouped into rhetorical 
themes.  There were four rhetorical groupings of argumentation for the proponents of the 
legislation: 
 
 1) Fairness: as a universal good, as it applies in the context of trade and trade policy. 
 :RUNHUV¶,QWHUHVWVDVDQDSSHDOWRFRPSDVVLRQ 
 3) National Interest: as an appeal to unity and patriotism. 
 4) Temporal Arguments: an appeal to urgency which underpinned the first three themes. 
 
These categories illustrate the primary rhetorical strategies intended to legitimate a shift in 
institutional logics to a more protectionist orientation. 
 
 4.1.1 Fairness 
 
This theme was revisited numerous times during the debate, as parliamentarians appealed to a sense 
of fairness in the context of trade.  Less expensive imports, produced in jurisdictions in which the 
cost of production, including labour, was below that of the United Kingdom was deemed to be 
unfair competition.  It was the role of the Government, proponents argued, to reduce or eliminate 
this source of unfairness through the imposition of tariffs and non-tariff barriers.  While the industry 
proponents asserted that they had no problem with competition and only wanted a fair chance to 
compete with these foreign goods, there was a suggestion that current free-trading policies were not 
in reality the result of a truly free market, as foreign producers were not competing fairly.  
Proponents employed this strategy not to directly oppose free trade, but to suggest that the current 
system was inherently unfair and therefore less free market oriented than a situation in which the 
Government increased tariff barriers, and as a result, fairness by leveling the playing field. 
 
This indirect rhetorical attack on free-trading can be seen in the words of Miss Horsbrugh when she 
VWDWHVWKDWVKH³ZDQW>V@WRVHHWDULIIVDVKLJKDs is necessary to equalise the difference between 
our own standard of living and that of potential importers, but not so high as to exclude a fair 
HOHPHQWRIFRPSHWLWLRQ´+DQVDUG 
 
This rhetorical strategy accomplished two goals: First, proponents argued that through a more 
protectionist approach to UK industry, the Government could assist in the restoration of fairness, 
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allowing UK industry to compete with products from lower-cost-of-production jurisdictions.  The 
implication of this argument was tKDWWKHLQGXVWU\¶VLQDELOLW\WRFRPSHWHZDVWKHUHVXOWRIVRPH
undefined unfairness.  This attempts to draw the argument away from the dichotomy of 
protectionism versus free trade, as during this time in UK history protectionists appeared to be 
losing this policy debate, and rather focus the argument on something universally disliked which 
was unfair practices.  Second, it allowed an indirect attack on current policy, low levels of 
protection against cheaper imports, by focusing on fair competition, thus leveraging, and co-opting, 
a foundational principle of the dominant institutional logic of free-trade. 
 
 4.1.2 Compassion 
 
The second rhetorical theme employed by the industry proponents was that of compassion.  
Ironically, it was the representatives of the mill and factory owners who advocated vociferously on 
EHKDOIRIZRUNHUV¶ULJKWVLQWKLVSDUWLFXODUFRQWH[WZKLOHUHVLVWLQJSUHVVXUHWRLQFUHDVHZDJHV
improve working conditions and reduce working hours in all normal labour relations contexts.   
 
Attempting to broaden the appeal of their protectionist position, the proponents emphasised the 
relationship between the overall health of the industry and the resultant benefits to the workers.  
Continuing to allow low-cost, foreign imports not only encouraged the exploitation of lower-wage 
workers outside the UK, but it endangered the jobs, standard of living and community livelihood for 
the many Britons dependent on the Jute industry.  Speaking for the proponents of the legislation, 
Miss Horsbrugh stated: 
 
  ³,should have liked to have asked the right hon. Gentleman, who has represented the 
 citizens of Dundee, whether he thinks that it is right that while he endeavours to raise the 
 standard of living of people in other parts of the world we should stand by and wait while 
 WKHVWDQGDUGRIOLYLQJDQGRIHPSOR\PHQWRIWKHSHRSOHLQWKLVFRXQWU\JRGRZQ´+DQVDUG
 1938)? 
 
The rhetorical dilemma presented in this context was one in which inaction on behalf of the 
Government would force the industry to revert to worse conditions and lower wages for UK 
workers in order to compete with foreign imports. 
 
Again, proponents employ rhetorical strategies which frame the debate in such a way as to avoid 
direct conflict with dominant institutional logics.  Two overlapping logics involved with this aspect 
RIWKHGHEDWHDVFDQEHVHHQLQWKHTXRWDWLRQDERYHDUHWKHSURWHFWLRQRIZRUNHUV¶VWDQGDUGVRI
living and the articulation of a dichotomous, zero-sum game in which the livelihood of British 
workers is compared with, and set against, the well-being of the foreign worker.  While we will 
explore the underlying logic of national interest below, the logic of Government protection of its 
FLWL]HQV¶ZRUNHUV¶ZHOIDUHLVHPEUDFHGWKURXJKWKLVUKHWRULFDOVWUDWHJ\ 
 
 4.1.3 National Interest 
 
The third rhetorical theme used by industry proponents was one of patriotism and national interest.  
Again, attempting to frame the debate in the broadest terms possible, and claim as many allies 
outside the Jute industry as possible, proponents expanded their rhetoric from the welfare of the 
worker and support of the industry to the benefits to all subjects/citizens and the benefit to the 
nation.   They employed repeatedly rhetoric of unity and national interest.  There was a recurrent 
mention of the µ0DGHLQ%ULWDLQ¶LGHDODQGWKHSURSRQHQWVOLQNHGWKHLUSUHIHUUHGSRVLWLRQRQWUDGH
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SROLF\ZLWKWKHKHDOWKRIWKH%ULWLVKHFRQRP\DQGWKHµULJKWIXO¶SRVLWLRQRIWKH8.DVWKHFHQWUHRID
global empire. 
 
This jingoistic approach can be seen in rhetoric proPRWLQJWKHDWWULEXWHVRI%ULWDLQ³7KHVHDUHJUHDW
assets. No country in the world has better soil, better mines, no people has a higher character or 
JUHDWHUVNLOO´+DQVDUG, Sir Wilson: 1938). 
 
Also, they sought to emphasize the importance and centrality of the Jute industry to the wellbeing 
of the national economy. 
 
 ³7KLVWUDGHLVYLWDOWRWKHFRXQWU\:HPXVWQHYHUIRUJHWZKDWSDUWWKHMXWHWUDGHPXVWSOD\LQ
 our defences in time of war, and a trade which is vital to the interests of this country cannot 
 be allowed to go down. Nor can an area be allowed to become derelict, and men and women 
 EHGHSULYHGRIWKHLUPHDQVRIOLYHOLKRRGIRUWKHZDQWRIDVPDOOPHDVXUHRISURWHFWLRQ´ 
 (Hansard, Miss Horsbrugh: 1938). 
 
Given the recent experience of the Great War, the industry attempted to link its relevance as central 
to the war effort.  Using the rhetoric of national interest, proponents warned the Government against 
allowing trade policy that would endanger vital industrial capabilities.  Yet again, proponents took 
an indirect approach in challenging the dominant logic of free trade.  Even though this rhetorical 
strategy does more directly challenge this dominant logic, it avoids a direct refutation of free trade 
and attempts to leverage the strength of the national interest logic, allowing it to compete with the 
free-trade logic.  It is not that protectionism is good and that free-trade is bad, it is that, given the 
QDWLRQ¶VXQLTXHQHHGVDQGSDUWLFXODUFLUFXPVWDQFHVWKHSUHIHUUHGSURWHFWLRQLVWSROLF\LVQHcessary 
and of vital national interest. 
 
 4.1.4 Urgency 
 
The final rhetorical strategy identified within the argumentation of the industry proponents was one 
of timing rather than content.  Proponents attempted to develop a sense of urgency, which 
encompassed and supported the other aspects of their rhetoric.  Complimentary with the other 
rhetorical themes, this sense of urgency was repeated to support the need for the Government to act.  
Relating to the immediate need to act to protect workers, Miss HorsbrXJKVWDWHG³,FDQDVVXUHKLP
that my gratitude will be echoed by many people outside this House who fear that their employment 
is in danger and that trouble is ahead for them unless the Government realise the difficulty and act 
TXLFNO\´+DQVDUG 
 
While this references the need to act quickly to save jobs, a theme of urgency permeates the rhetoric 
RIWKHGHEDWHDQGLVFHQWUDOWRWKHSURSRQHQWV¶DWWHPSWVWRSDVVWKLVOHJLVODWLRQ7KLVHPSKDVLVRQ
the need to take action, whether real or manufactured, was pronounced: If the future of the DJI is to 
be secured, action needs to be taken quickly. 
 
Themes of fairness in trade policy, compassion for the impact on British workers, centrality to the 
national interest and the health of the country and, finally, underpinning these rhetorical strategies 
with the temporal theme of urgency, were employed by industry proponents and supporters of the 
µ,PSRUWDWLRQVIURP2YHUVHDV¶ parliamentary debate. 
 
5. Discussion 
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Proponents of the industry focused on four primary rhetorical strategies in their attempt to pass 
protectionist-oriented legislation that would protect the DJI from less expensive jute imports.  From 
a content perspective, they used the rhetoric of fairness, compassion towards workers and national 
interest.  Each of these rhetorical foci was infused with the rhetoric of urgency.  From an overall 
narrative perspective this process-based rhetoric attempted to create a call to action to restrict low-
priced, jute-based imports. 
 
The types of content-based, rhetorical strategies of jute industry proponents have been previously 
identified in the model of discursive strategies of Vaara, et al (2006).  As noted above, this model 
developed categories for rhetorical strategies of legitimation: normalization, authorization, 
rationalization, moralization and narrativization.  While their model was developed in a different 
temporal, industrial and national context, it offers a framework applicable for understanding the key 
elements of rhetorical strategies of the Dundee Jute producers of the inter-war period.  The table 
below illustrates the application of this model to the empirical context of this research, however the 
additional elements of urgency and avoidance will be examined later in the discussion. 
 
Table 1: ApplicatiRQRI9DDUDHWDO¶V0RGHORI'LVFXUVLYH6WUDWHJLHVWRWKHUKHWRULFDOVWUDWHJLHVRI'-,
proponents during the 1938 legislative debates on UK trade policy: 
Rhetorical Themes from the Jute Debate Vaara, et al. (2006) 
Appeal to Fairness moralization, rationalization 
Appeal to Compassion moralization 
Appeal to National Interest rationalization, moralization 
Appeal to Urgency rationalization 
 
 
In the Vaara, et al. (2006) model of discursive strategies, rationalization is defined as the process of 
³OHJLWLPDWLRQE\UHIHUHQFHWRWKHXWLOLW\RUIXQFWLRQRIVSHFLILFDFWLRQVRUSUDFWLFHV´S7KH
authors note that this particular form of rationalization highlights the financial and economic 
advantages of corporate restructuring.  In the findings of the analysis of the jute debate, it is not 
surprising there is a close link between the rationalization and moralization categories, as Vaara, et 
DOVWDWH³DOOUDWLRQDOL]DWLRQVZHUHEDVHGRQVSHFLILFPRUDODQGLGHRORJLFDOJURXQGV>LQ
fact] >U@DWLRQDOL]DWLRQDOZD\VKDVDPRUDOEDVLVDOWKRXJKQRWDOZD\VDQH[SOLFLWRQH´S 
 
Yet there are further similarities in the legitimating rhetorical strategies used across both 
temporal/empirical contexts.  The rhetorical strategy of aligninJ-XWHLQGXVWU\SURSRQHQWV¶LQWHUHVWV
ZLWK%ULWDLQ¶VQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWZDVIUHTXHQWO\HPSOR\HGDVLGHQWLILHGDERYH(YRFDWLRQVRI
national interest in the industrial restructuring debates examined by Vaara, et al (2006) were used as 
a moralising rhetoricDOVWUDWHJ\³0RUHVSHFLILFDOO\ZKHQMRXUQDOLVWVZDQWHGWRTXHVWLRQWKH
legitimacy of the merger or global industrial restructuring more generally, they often reverted to 
nationalistic (emphasizing the national interests as the key value) or humanistic (prioritizing the 
LQWHUHVWVRIWKHHPSOR\HHVGLVFRXUVHV´S7KHVHPRUDOL]DWLRQDQGUDWLRQDOL]DWLRQVWUDWHJLHV
in the Finnish-Swedish context were, in the media, used as de-legitimating devices: rhetoric that 
sought to question the validity of industrial restructuring.  In the UK jute debate, opponents of the 
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free-trade oriented status quo used these strategies.  Therefore in both contexts there were strategies 
of de-legitimation towards neo-liberal ideology and practice. 
 
While these four primary rhetorical strategies have been identified, and articulated above, as 
VHSDUDWHUKHWRULFDOVWUDWHJLHVWKH\ZHUHEURXJKWWRJHWKHUDQGLQWHUWZLQHGLQWKHSURSRQHQWV¶
discursive argumentation.  For example, there was significant overlap in the rhetoric of appeals to 
fairness and appeals to compassion towards workers.  The foundation of the appeal to fairness was 
EDVHGRQ'XQGHH¶VLQDELOLW\WRFRPSHWHZLWKFKHDSHULPSRUWV7KHVHLPSRUWVZHUHOHVVH[SHQVLYH
largely due to the fact that the cost of labour in India was significantly less.  It was argued that this 
basic unfairness not only threatened jute producers, but by extension the workers, their livelihoods, 
their families and their communities.   
Likewise, there were strong connections drawn between the overall financial health of the industry, 
and the health of the national economy.  At times during the debate the issues of employment and 
national economic strength were used in tandem.  Finally, the appeal to urgency was used to frame 
the entire discourse for Government action.  A Government that failed to act quickly would abide 
unfairness, lack compassion and weaken the nation.    
While it can be argued that the rhetorical strategy of urgency EHORQJVWR9DDUD¶VFDWHJRU\RI
rationalization because the argument is framed such that swift action would result in favourable 
outcomes and therefore is an argument, which appeals to rational action, this final rhetorical 
category can be viewed differently from the others.  The first three provide the content of the 
overall argumentation, or the narrativization and while a sense of urgency does shape the narrative 
it can be viewed as process-focused, rather than content-focused.  Within the context of the Vaara, 
et al (2006) model this is a more indirect method of addressing the issue of timing; however, the 
EURDGHUUKHWRULFDOOLWHUDWXUHGRHVUHFRJQLVHWKHH[LVWHQFHDQGLPSRUWDQFHRIµNDLURV¶RUDQDSSHDOWR
timing (Suddaby and Greenwood: 2005) as a viable rhetorical legitimating device. 
 5.1 Avoiding rather than shifting Institutional Logics: 
 
Collectively, these four rhetorical appeals are intended to pass legislation that would allow 
Parliament to articulate to the Government that they should support British industries in general, 
and the DJI, in particular, by maintaining existing import tariff barriers and introducing further 
trade protections against less expensive imports which compete with domestic industries. 
 
Previous rhetorical literature assumes that these discursive contests are intended to introduce 
profound institutional change by shifting dominant logics. (see Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005).  
However, what becomes clear in the analysis of the rhetorical strategies of industry supporters 
within parliament is that they attempted to separate Government policy from its institutional logic 
moorings.  Government policy on tariffs had a clear free-trade orientation that was based on an 
underlying, dominant pro-liberal institutional logic. Rather than attempting to shift the dominant 
logic of free trade to one of protectionism, they focused their rhetoric on showing how the current 
policies were unfair and possibly anti-competitive.  While the success of such rhetoric would mean 
a more protectionist, economic policy in practice, it was presented as if it could still be reconciled 
with, and indeed supported by, the institutional logic of free trade.  In fact, when proponents of a 
proudly protectionist and anti-free trade amendment, that sought a complete ban on all imports 
produced in nations with wages and working standards lower than the UK, was introduced 
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proponents of the original legislation spoke in opposition to this strong and direct challenge to the 
dominant free-WUDGHLQVWLWXWLRQDOORJLF/LNHZLVHWKHUKHWRULFDOVWUDWHJ\RIZRUNHUV¶ZHOIDUHZDV
employed not from an anti-free trade perspective, thus attempting to directly challenge the 
dominant pro-IUHHWUDGHORJLFEXWUDWKHULWZDVDQDWWHPSWWRKLJKOLJKWWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VUROHRI
protecting and ensuring the welfare of society. 
 
Finally, the rhetorical strategy of national interest was the closest that jute industry supporters came 
rhetorically to directly opposing or attempting to displacing the dominant, free trade institutional 
logic.  However, rather than an attempt to usurp the dominate logic of free-trade with an insurgent 
logic of protectionism, they attempted to use another dominate logic of National Interest to 
advocate for their change in Government trade policy. 
 
Prior research has focused on the role of rhetoric in legitimating profound institutional change 
(replacing dominant institutional logics in favour of new insurgent logics) (Suddaby and 
Greenwood: 2005); however, it should be noted that in this context proponents of change were 
more concerned about altering policy rather than shifting dominant logics.  In fact, the dominant 
logics of free trade were never strongly or directly confronted by industry proponents.  As noted 
above, the most direct challenge to the dominant pro-free trade logic was their use of another 
dominant logic, that of the national interest, and not the invocation of an alternative, insurgent, pro-
protectionist logic.   
 
This case provides an example of rhetorical strategies that challenge policy, while avoiding a direct 
or explicit challenge to dominant institutional logics.  In fact, the rhetoric seeks to set-aside a more 
fundamental debate on the appropriateness of current dominant logics to avoid resistance to their 
policy objectives even when, under close examination, their policy objectives are contradictory to 
dominant institutional logics.  Overall, the rhetorical strategies employed by industry proponents 
were strengthened by, not a challenge to, the dominant institutional logics of the time. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study focused on analysing rhetorical strategies employed by advocates of the DJI during the 
+RXVHRI3DUOLDPHQWµImportations from Overseas¶GHEDWHLQWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP
Proponents of the protection of the DJI sought to legitimise the preservation and imposition of 
import tariffs to counter growing international competition from foreign goods within their 
domestic market.  It explored the relevance of 9DDUDHWDO¶VPRGHOIRUOLQJXLVWLF-based 
legitimation strategies to these findings. Clearly, the rhetoric applied by the jute industry was not 
able to persuade the Government to implement trade policies that would help protect the domestic 
industry from cheaper foreign imports.  Although this study did not analyse the reasons for its 
failure, a possible explanation could be contextual in nature: the reduced political significance of 
the DJI to the national government (Cox 2013: 172-173). 
This study makes the following contributions.  First, while Vaara et al (2006) analysed the 
discursive strategies present in media accounts of a contemporary industrial merger, this study 
focuses on rhetorical strategies deployed in the realm of an historical public policy debate with the 
aim of influencing government to pursue a favourable trade policy to a particular industry.  
Importantly, the rhetoric was used to challenge policy, but not the underlying dominant logics.  
Second, existing literature on the DJI has focused on the government-industry relationship during 
the post-war period (1950s to 1960s) (Masrani and McKiernan 2011; Morelli, Tomlinson and 
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Wright 2012) while this study provides further insight into this relationship, as it existed during the 
inter-war period. Third, this study develops the literature on µlanguage as a source of legitimacy¶ by 
shifting the focus of rhetorical studies away from individual firms to a declining industry and to 
Government debate. Finally, the study broadens the categorisations of rhetorical strategies and 
attempts to map these onto previous studies. 
While this research focuses solely on the content of rhetorical strategies, an interesting focus for 
future research would be the process of rhetorical creation.  For example, how were these strategies 
chosen?  Were they deliberately chosen, random or emergent? Were the actors in the DJI 
unanimous in their agreement as to the rhetorical strategies that should be used?   What was the role 
RILQGLYLGXDOSHUVRQDOLWLHVLQVKDSLQJWKHLQGXVWU\¶VUKHWRULFDODSSURDFK")XUWKHUDEURDGHU
FRQWH[WXDOVWXG\VXUURXQGLQJWKH8.¶VDSSURDFKWRIUHHWUDGHWKDWLQYROYHGDQDQDO\VLVRIWKH
competitive position of the UK industries that had actual and potential success at the time, will 
enable the position of the DJI to be compared more fully and allow for a better reasoning on the 
failure of these particular rhetorical strategies. Finally, a study that examined the juxtaposition of an 
instance of rhetorical failure with an instance of rhetorical success, would allow for a greater 
understanding as to what makes a rhetorical appeal effective.  Such a study could combine an 
examination of the process, content and context of rhetoric creation and deployment across 
empirical settings.  
In the history of the DJI, decline continued from these inter war years until the last bale of jute was 
delivered and processed in Dundee in the late 199V7KHFLW\¶VMXWHPXVHXPLs the last vestige of a 
once proud and productive sector. 
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